Algorithm-Aided Prediction of Patient Preferences - An Ethics Sneak Peek by Biller-Andorno, Nikola & Biller, Armin








Algorithm-Aided Prediction of Patient Preferences - An Ethics Sneak Peek
Biller-Andorno, Nikola ; Biller, Armin
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMms1904869





Biller-Andorno, Nikola; Biller, Armin (2019). Algorithm-Aided Prediction of Patient Preferences - An
Ethics Sneak Peek. New England Journal of Medicine, 381(15):1480-1485.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMms1904869
M e d i c i n e  a n d  S o c i e t y
T h e  n e w  e ngl a nd  j o u r na l  o f  m e dic i n e
n engl j med 381;15 nejm.org October 10, 20191480
Debra Malina, Ph.D., Editor
Algorithm-Aided Prediction of Patient Preferences  
— An Ethics Sneak Peek
Nikola Biller-Andorno, M.D., Ph.D., and Armin Biller, M.D.
The use of artificial intelligence (AI) is increas-
ingly common in medicine, as it is in other 
fields. Just as AI systems using natural language 
processing answer legal questions, predict court 
decisions, and prepare contracts,1 and as self-
driving cars gather traffic information so they 
can make and act on decisions,2 diagnostic algo-
rithms already outperform radiologists and derma-
tologists,3 estimate life expectancy,4,5 and detect 
health risks.6 Health care AI alone is expected 
to become a $20 billion market within the next 
5 years.7 Training algorithms to predict people’s 
advance health care choices seem to be in keep-
ing with the stream of emerging applications, 
and it would be surprising if we had long to wait 
before products based on such technology be-
came commercially available. For instance, natural 
language processing of electronic health records 
(EHRs) can be used to identify patients with 
indications for palliative interventions almost as 
well as human classifiers can, but in a fraction 
of the time.8
Advance decisions about such matters as do-
not-attempt-resuscitation (DNAR) status, organ 
donation, and curative versus palliative care are 
based on individual preferences and values and 
frequently reflect moral choices. They are notori-
ously difficult for others to make for the person 
in question, especially if no clear instructions 
have been provided through an advance directive 
or care plan. It is a well-known problem in clini-
cal ethics that surrogates may make decisions 
that are inconsistent with the person’s prefer-
ences and values.9 Readily available intelligent 
decision support might improve the process, 
which must often take place in suboptimal con-
ditions involving time constraints, stress, unclear 
advance directives, unavailability of surrogates, 
personal bias, or conflicts of interest.
We describe three potential applications in 
the boxes. An AI-based “DNAR Predictor” might 
be useful for physicians who have to make rapid 
decisions about patients they don’t know. The 
hypothetical “Am I an Organ Donor?” app could 
foster reflection and decision making concerning 
personal choices such as organ donation. A “Be 
the Best Surrogate You Can Be” app might help 
a relative who is not well prepared for the role of 
surrogate. All these examples are thought experi-
ments at this point, but we believe that similar 
applications will be developed in the near future. 
Should they prove to be useful, reliable, and 
convenient, they might easily become standard 
tools with widespread use. Advising surrogates 
and clinicians rather than replacing individual 
choice, they could be seen as enhancing patient 
autonomy and augmenting decision making.10
Ms. X. collapses on the street, and an ambulance trans-
ports her to the nearest hospital. In the emergency de-
partment, her condition remains unstable. Dr. A. looks 
up her file in the EHR used by all the town’s health care 
institutions and discovers that she’s in her late 70s, has 
several serious chronic conditions, and was diagnosed 
with cancer in the past year. He finds no DNAR order, 
Physician’s Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST) 
form, or similar document, no advance directive, and no 
information about a legal representative or a family doctor.
Dr. A. runs the DNAR Predictor program that was re-
cently installed on the hospital system. It uses an algo-
rithm that was trained on the data and DNAR preferences 
of a large number of patients and compares the available 
information about Ms. X. with the profiles of other patients 
to determine the likelihood that she would have wanted a 
resuscitation attempt. Dr. A. informs the team about the 
results of his search. A few moments later, Ms. X. goes 
into cardiac arrest.
The DNAR Predictor
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We also know, however, that the use of algo-
rithms raises ethical worries, particularly when 
life-or-death decisions are concerned.3 One ob-
jection relates to the individual nature of the 
decisions to be made. Resuscitation and organ-
donor status seem like highly personal choices 
informed by one’s life experiences and values. 
What import could an algorithm possibly have? 
It’s unlikely that an AI-based prediction of a 
given person’s choice will ever match ground 
truth completely, since unforeseeable consider-
ations and inconsistencies may come into play. 
But even a prediction that has an 80% or 90% 
likelihood of being accurate might be valuable 
information. How good such predictions can get 
is an open question right now. The richer the 
individual-level data available for training, the 
better the prediction is likely to be. We may find 
that our supposedly highly individual responses 
depend in a fairly predictable way on our phys-
ical and psychological situation, socialization, 
previous experiences, and values.
Beyond Human Limits
It could be argued that algorithms trained on 
vast amounts of individual-level data are un-
wieldy or even superfluous. Who needs an algo-
rithm to suggest the same decisions people 
would make themselves? Such a function might 
become critical, however, when choices have to 
be made, for instance, regarding continued life 
support for someone who can no longer make 
decisions.
Algorithms would not only be able to find 
patterns within our own past decision making 
but could also compare them to patterns and 
decisions of many other people. The “wisdom of 
crowds”11 could thus be harnessed for individual 
decision making. This possibility raises a num-
ber of issues. For one, algorithms can become 
only as good as the data on which they’re 
trained. If the available human decisions — on 
resuscitation status, for instance — are not well 
informed, the algorithm will perpetuate the re-
sults of bad decision making. Knowledge about 
the quality of the process and, even better, the 
outcomes of the decisions, as well as about the 
overall quality of the training data, will be impor-
tant if we are to have a realistic view of the 
predictions’ value.
A second, no less important, issue is the risk 
of bias.12 Since most AI approaches require a huge 
amount of training data input to produce mean-
ingful output, the preferences of “crowds” will 
be used to train programs. As a consequence, 
even as preferences are learned, human bias — 
certain attitudes — will be introduced into the 
training data. Then, when the AI program is 
applied to a population that holds different atti-
tudes, it may make inaccurate predictions but do 
so with a high level of confidence. As a conse-
In response to a challenge in his college sociology class, 
Mr. Y. is trying to figure out whether or not he wishes to 
be an organ donor, but he’s having trouble reaching a 
conclusion. On his professor’s advice, he downloads the 
“Am I an organ donor?” app on his smartphone, opens 
it, and answers a number of questions about his age, life-
style, ethnicity, core values, and other topics. He allows 
the app to link to his Instagram account and his contact 
list. The app compares his profile with the profiles and 
donation decisions in its large database. After a few sec-
onds, Mr. Y. is told that he’s unlikely to want to donate 
his organs (the odds against it are 78%). Slightly taken 
aback, since he had considered himself an altruistic per-
son, Mr. Y. ponders what the results mean for his class 
assignment and, more important, for his decision about 
obtaining a donor card.
Am I an Organ Donor?
Fifty-year-old Ms. Z. has had a massive stroke and is in 
the neurologic intensive care unit. The medical team has 
contacted her family to discuss how best to proceed, given 
that even if Ms. Z. survived with maximal therapy, she 
would probably be severely disabled for the rest of her life. 
The alternative is to withdraw life support and let her die.
Ms. Z.’s relatives are at a loss. Should they let her go 
without having tried everything? But maybe keeping her 
alive is worse than death? Before the stroke, she was quite 
active, energetically pursuing many social projects in her 
community. None of her relatives have talked to her about 
what she would want in a situation like this. She had seemed 
healthy and fit and didn’t believe in “pre-worrying.” The 
family was not aware of an advance directive and didn’t 
think one existed.
One of Ms. Z.’s nephews, a lawyer, recalled seeing a 
report on an app that was designed for exactly this situ-
ation. The report had drawn on empirical evidence in ar-
guing that surrogates are frequently biased by their own 
preferences or make wrong assumptions about their rel-
atives’ values. AI could help eliminate bias and predict 
whether, under specified circumstances, the relative 
would have preferred palliative care over continued ther-
apeutic efforts. The nephew suggests that the family feed 
information about Ms. Z. into the system and see what it 
recommends.
Be the Best Surrogate You Can Be
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quence, there is a need to audit whether an algo-
rithm is qualified to perform a specific task in a 
specific population. Discussion of the capabili-
ties and limitations of detecting and managing 
algorithmic bias is ongoing in the AI world.13,14
But if training data were no longer needed, 
the specter of bias would disappear. Progress is 
being made on this front: Google’s AutoML, for 
instance, taught itself to develop machine learn-
ing programs, and the code it generated scored 
higher in a task of localizing multiple objects 
than the code written by humans. DeepMind’s 
algorithm AlphaGo Zero taught itself how to 
play the game Go, given only the basic game 
rules.15 It scored better than its predecessor, 
AlphaGo, and defeated the world’s best human 
player. David Silver, AlphaGo Zero’s lead pro-
grammer, says: “By not using human data — by 
not using human expertise in any fashion — 
we’ve actually removed the constraints of human 
knowledge.”16
Technic al and Pr ac tic al 
Questions
Conceiving of AI as a substitute for human deci-
sion making is challenging from a technical point 
of view. Examining the relationship between AI 
and decision making, Jean-Charles Pomerol has 
delineated two major aspects of decision making: 
diagnosis and “look ahead.”17 Diagnosis involves 
pattern matching and is therefore perfectly ame-
nable to AI. Look ahead requires both the ability 
to combine many actions and events and the 
ability to anticipate all possible reactions. Back 
in 1997, Pomerol had already predicted a bril-
liant future for machines that could perform 
both diagnostic and look-ahead functions. Today, 
IBM’s Watson Trend predicts human preferences 
for use in recommendation systems.18 DeepStack, 
a poker-playing algorithm for settings with im-
perfect information (as in poker, where not all 
players have identical information), handles each 
situation as it arises, using fast approximate es-
timates, which can be thought of as intuition, 
instead of in-depth computations.19 Like human 
intuition, DeepStack’s intuition needs to be 
trained, but then it can accurately predict the 
behavior of its antagonists and thereby act in 
ways that make its own behavior unpredictable.
Beyond general concerns about the wisdom 
and feasibility of using algorithms to predict 
personal choices, there are more practical ques-
tions regarding the generation and use of data.20 
Will data used for training algorithms be well 
protected against leaks or attacks? Will algo-
rithms be designed for ethically appropriate 
purposes? We can imagine an algorithm-based 
clinical decision support tool that would — pre-
sumably on the basis of predicted patient prefer-
ences — recommend palliative care or the con-
tinuation of aggressive treatment primarily for 
economic reasons, and its recommendation could 
provide legitimation for action.
Additional questions emerge when we look 
beyond the use of a single algorithm. Will algo-
rithm-generated information — for instance, 
about consumer choices, social life, health risks, 
and resuscitation status — be stored in some 
central database? Who will have access to it, and 
for what purposes? Clear governance and appro-
priate consumer-protection mechanisms need to 
be developed to address such challenges.21,22
Mor alit y,  Tr ansparenc y,  Humanit y
Even once rules have been defined for appropri-
ate data handling, an issue remains that is par-
ticularly important with regard to moral deci-
sions: algorithms are not always transparent. 
Concerns about trusting a “black box” have been 
expressed in relation to the entire field of ma-
chine learning, despite recent efforts to create AI 
that is explainable.23 When it comes to moral 
decisions, ethicists have a long history of trying 
to spell out and probe arguments in a way that 
is comprehensible to others. On the other hand, 
we might argue, people are not necessarily fol-
lowing rational reasoning standards when defin-
ing their personal preferences — for instance, for 
or against organ donation. In fact, they some-
times find it hard to define what their prefer-
ences are when clinicians urgently need to know. 
Although some philosophers and computer scien-
tists have argued in favor of harnessing machines 
as ethics advisors or even ethical agents,24,25 out-
sourcing ethical considerations to machines still 
seems peculiar: we hold moral judgment dear as 
a function reserved for humans. Some ethicists, 
following Immanuel Kant, believe that human 
dignity rests in our species’ capacity for moral 
judgment. Will we cede this special ability to 
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machines? What happens to human autonomy 
when we delegate important decisions to machines 
that we believe know better than we do?
On the other hand, since the advent of the 
global positioning system (GPS), we do not seem 
to have lost our capacity for spatial orientation, 
although we may bother less to mentally prepare 
a route or, through use of such devices, develop 
a sense of dependency on navigation assistance. 
Indeed, one might argue that a GPS allows us to 
train our orientation by providing constant feed-
back. We still tell the system where we want to 
go, and we choose the route. We can also depart 
from the system’s suggestions at any time. We 
can turn it off. We can update it with new soft-
ware. Yet future generations may find it quite 
unthinkable to do entirely without a GPS. Per-
haps the role of AI-assisted ethical decision 
making will be similar.
The prospect that algorithms may compound 
the effects of evidence-based medicine, guide-
lines, and budget targets in limiting the scope 
available for individual clinical judgment is dis-
concerting to clinicians who believe that their 
professionalism is under threat.26 The American 
Medical Association addresses this point by con-
ceiving of AI not as artificial intelligence but as 
“augmented intelligence” that enhances rather 
than replaces physicians’ expertise.27 But even if 
algorithmic predictions were at first understood 
as voluntary decision support, they might even-
tually turn into perceived standards so that re-
fraining from their use or departing from their 
recommendations would require justification.28
How would the patient–provider relationship 
be affected when physicians followed algorithms 
in making life-or-death decisions? And who would 
be accountable or liable for decisions that did 
not turn out well, whether physicians had used 
algorithm-based support tools or renounced their 
use?29 Because of the insecurities reflected in 
such questions, an AI-based system might have 
low uptake by clinicians or low actual impact on 
decisions. On the other hand, if algorithms de-
monstrably helped clinicians, patients, and fam-
ilies to reach better decisions more efficiently, 
health care providers would probably be inter-
ested. Even if algorithms erred in a certain per-
centage of cases, their performance would need 
to be compared not with ideal conditions but 
with clinical reality, which can be messy and 
affected by time pressure, lack of crucial infor-
mation, an overwhelmed family, unavailability of 
translators, and other factors. Algorithm-based 
preference prediction would be fast and easy to 
document — characteristics that might arouse 
concern that it would have too great an effect on 
decisions, with predictions taken at face value 
and immediately guiding and providing justifi-
cation for clinical action. Defining the appropri-
ate deployment of AI-based decision support will 
be vital for successful implementation.
Development Consider ations
It seems inevitable that machine learning will 
make its way into the realm of moral decisions. 
To protect patients and clinicians, we will need 
to ensure that the safety, validity, reproducibility, 
usability, and reliability of algorithm-based deci-
sion aids are established with the required scien-
tific rigor.30
Getting good training data is not easy. Digital 
platforms that not only contain health records 
but also help patients generate and document 
well-considered preferences regarding future 
health care choices, providing interfaces for ex-
change with care providers as needed, could be 
a great resource for the training of algorithms. 
Ideally, the decisions could be assessed retro-
spectively by surrogates, care providers, or both.
Transparency and comprehensibility — 
achieved, for example, by revealing an algo-
rithm’s decision trees and how the results relate 
to human considerations — will also be impor-
tant features of ethical algorithm-aided decision 
making.
Performance benchmarks will need to be de-
veloped by comparing algorithmic predictions of 
preferences with the current standard — the 
projections of surrogates or the courses that care 
providers would have taken. Given that trying to 
surmise another person’s preferences is a tricky 
and imperfect business,31 we would not be sur-
prised to find that algorithms outperform even 
close relatives.
Quality control and monitoring of algorithm-
based support systems are crucial and will have 
to incorporate vigilance for built-in bias and dis-
crimination. The structures, standards, and pro-
cesses that the pharmaceutical regulators use in 
evaluating drugs for approval might serve as a 
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model. In fact, the Food and Drug Administra-
tion has over the past few years started approv-
ing algorithms used in health care for functions 
such as early detection of atrial fibrillation, diag-
nosis using ultrasound imaging, and prediction 
of seizures32 and is currently further developing 
and refining its procedures.33
Clear and enforceable rules regarding data 
protection and privacy as well as robust mecha-
nisms for consumer protection are necessary pre-
conditions for trustworthy AI-based preference 
predictors.
Conclusions
In order to harness the potential of algorithms 
for improving decision making, we will need to 
remain aware of their limits. It is well known, 
for instance, that even well-performing algo-
rithms can be unreliable in individual cases. 
Context and explanations are still hard for algo-
rithms to grasp. A single algorithm may have 
shortcomings that necessitate a combination of 
approaches. From an ethical perspective, it is of 
prime importance not to rush into commercial 
exploitation of potentially attractive decision-
support apps, but instead to carefully probe 
what is really feasible. At this point, algorithms 
may be able to provide likelihoods of someone’s 
preferences on matters such as resuscitation, 
organ donation, or palliative care, but such out-
puts do not and should not amount to outsourc-
ing and automating moral judgment. The ethical 
decision and the responsibility that comes with 
it still rest with the human agent.
Algorithms may prompt us to revisit some 
questions that ethicists have long puzzled over, 
such as how we can know what a good ethical 
decision is. They also raise new ones: Will algo-
rithms end up making better, more reliable, and 
more consistent moral choices than humans do? 
What can we learn from algorithms to improve 
our ethical reasoning and decision-making 
skills? How can we create the most effective 
synergies between human and artificial intel-
ligence? The algorithm-aided prediction of in-
dividual health care preferences may make for 
an interesting test case as we explore these 
questions.
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